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What's in a Name? The
Change From Datsun to Nissan
By Daniel Banks
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An abbreviated version
of this article originally appeared in the January 2002 issue of the Z
Car Club of Northern Virginia Newsletter. This article has also been
updated based on conversations between the author and Mr. K at the 15th
Annual Z.C.C.A. Convention in San Antonio, June 17 – 21, 2002.
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Every Z car enthusiast
immediately recognizes the name “Datsun” and many can even come up with
the fact that “D.A.T.” of Datsun stood for the initials of the last
names of… well, at that point things get a bit fuzzy. But we know where
the significance lies and the details are merely a quick review away in
the Z.C.C.A.’s Mr. K. book. What may be more interesting is that so
many Americans old enough to have been driving a decade or so probably
retain enough brand awareness to remember that “Datsun” was once a
Japanese car. Probably most remember that Datsuns were what we bought
in the good old days and now call Nissans. Thanks to Mr. K., the brand
name “Datsun” retains recognition in America right up there with “TWA”
and “Coca Cola.”
A few decades back, beginning with an announcement in fall of 1981,
Datsun’s parent Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. decided to change the name
on cars sold in the United States and Canada from Datsun to Nissan.
Actually, getting to either the name “Datsun” or “Nissan” from a
standing start is a story filled with history. It begins in the first
decades of the 20th century with Japan’s earliest automobile builders,
includes the effects of the great Kanto Earthquake of September 1, 1923
and of course WWII. For this article, however, let’s stick to the
script and save the full history behind these names for another time.
The name change campaign had a variety of rationales. On the surface,
it appears solely business oriented in justification, while other more
provocative reasons may exist, especially within the Datsun-centric Z
car community. Chapter 3, “Brand Awareness,” of David A. Aaker’s 1991
book: “MANAGING BRAND EQUITY; Capitalizing on the Value of a Brand
Name” begins with “The Datsun-Becomes-Nissan Story.” Aaker presents
interesting business world facts as to why Nissan made this change.
Ultimately, he supports a conclusion that the name change campaign over
a 3-year period from 1982 to 1984 cost Nissan in excess of $500 million
dollars. Wow! For Z enthusiasts unfamiliar with this little bit of
Datsun/Nissan history, here goes.
First up, an examination of
why Nissan probably chose to retain the name “Datsun” when they
committed to the United States market in 1960. Aaker suggests that the
reason involves Japan and WWII. This perspective says the corporate
choice favored “Datsun” to distance the parent factory Nissan’s
association by Americans with Japanese WWII military manufacture. Even
as the first passenger car rolled off the assembly line at their
Yokohama plant on April 11, 1935, Nissan had only a few years before
all manufacturing shifted to military needs. By 1939 Nissan had moved
to Manchuria where its founder and President, Yoshisuke Ayukawa,
established the Manchurian Motor Company to manufacture military
trucks. Identified by David Halberstam in “The Reckoning” as a well
connected, aggressive risk taker, Ayukawa also made himself a principal
partner of the Japanese Colonial Government of Manchukuo. Ultimately,
Nissan Heavy Industries emerged near the end of WWII as an important
player in Japan’s war machinery. When WWII ended, Russia seized and
carted off all of Nissan’s Manchuria operations, while the Occupation
Forces made use of over 50% of the Yokohama plant. General MacArthur
had Ayukawa imprisoned for 21 months as a war criminal. After release
he was forbidden from returning to any corporate or public office until
1951. He was never allowed back into Nissan, which returned to
passenger car manufacture in 1947 and to its original name of Nissan
Motor Company, Ltd. in 1949.
It seems supportable that
Americans bought Datsuns instead of Nissans to isolate Datsun from its
parent’s WWII history in American memory. American service personnel in
their teens or early 20s during WWII would be in prime car-buying age
by 1960, if only to find an economical, small second car for their
growing family needs. Mr. K would have had his personal WWII history in
mind supporting the name Datsun. It is known that Mr. K. was sent to
Nissan’s Manchuria truck factory in 1939. Conditions he saw there,
briefly described on page 71 of the ZCCA Mr. K. book, were bad enough
that he walked away from it. Again in 1945, near the end of WWII, Mr.
K. was ordered to return to the Manchurian plant and simply refused.
His motto “Love Cars, Love Life, Love People” long predates his work
for Datsun in America. For one whose spirit desired to build and sell
passenger cars to people using them in peaceful pursuit, it was the
name Datsun that survived WWII with its purity intact. So discouraged
was Mr. K. about his prospects and goings on at Nissan that he was
reportedly on the verge of resigning when Datsun’s 1958 Australian
Mobilgas victories vaunted him, as leader of the winning Datsun teams,
to national prominence in a Japan intent on regaining status in the
world. Then Mr. K came to America. Suffice that as long as Mr. K had
any say in matters as West Coast Vice President from 1960 – 1965 and
then President of Nissan Motor Company – USA from 1965 to 1975, the
cars would be sold as Datsuns.
By the time Nissan began its
campaign to change their name, “Datsun” had huge recognition in the
American market. Datsun had become solidly entrenched in our automotive
vocabulary. Aaker states that in 1981 “the awareness level of Nissan in
the U.S. was only 2% as compared to 85% for the Datsun name.”
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Nissan President Katsuji
Kawamata and the Name Datsun.

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At this
point we can read what probably constituted a long held “official”
company bias against use of the name “Datsun” from an early 1970s
interview of parent Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., Japan President Katsuji
Kawamata. This appears in the April 7, 1973 issue of Business Week
magazine in a cover story article covering Nissan President Katsuji
Kawamata plans for handling competition from Toyota and the dollar
devaluation of the early 1970s. At the time, Kawamata was a 26-year
veteran of Nissan and in his final year as President. His rise to its
leadership position occurred in 1957 in part because of his handling of
the critical Nissan worker’s strike that began May 25, 1953 and ran for
100 days. The 5-page Business Week article also includes statements
from Mr. K and a vintage photograph of him standing among his beloved
Datsuns in a dealer showroom. Regarding the name “Datsun,” the
representative paragraph quoted below is from page 69. Again, remember
this was April 1973.
“Kawamata regrets that his
company did not imprint its corporate name on cars, the way Toyota
does. ‘Looking back, we wish we had started using Nissan on all of our
cars,’ he says. ‘But Datsun was a pet name for the cars when we started
exporting.’ ” Business Week goes on to state that the ‘DAT’ in Datsun
comes from the last names of Nissan’s founders - Den, Aoyama, and
Takeuchi.
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At the San Antonio Z.C.C.A.
Convention Mr. K. signed, dated, and wrote his age over his photo in my
copy of the April 7, 1973 issue of BusinessWeek. He did this while
“grimacing” at the opposing page photo of Kawamata, then showed his
writing to an associate and both men had a good laugh. When it came to
selling Datsuns in the United States, Kawamata and Mr. K reportedly did
not see eye to eye on much.
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Well, predictable words from
the Man himself. This despite Business Week’s error that Den, Aoyama,
and Takeuchi founded Nissan. They did not, of course. Kenjiro Den,
Rokuro Aoyama, and Meitaro Takeuchi were 3 financial backers and
friends for one of the originators of the Japanese automobile industry,
Masujiro Hashimoto, who founded Kaishinsha Jidosha Koto, or “Kaishinsha
Motor Car Works” in 1911. Incidentally, Kawamata is said to have
delighted in naming Nissan’s cars. He came up with the names “Violet,”
“Cedric,” “Bluebird,” and of course our favorite, “Fairlady.” The
well-known story about Fairlady is that Kawamata had seen the Broadway
musical “My Fair Lady” while visiting the United States in 1958. He was
immediately beloved of the musical and its name. This Business Week
article, however, further reports “Nissan’s marketing experts fear that
such effeminate names would never make it abroad. In the U.S., for
example, the Fairlady becomes the Datsun 240Z and the Bluebird becomes
the Datsun 610.”
Returning to Aaker, here
are the 2 substantive paragraphs on page 57 where he presents reasons
behind the Datsun to Nissan name change.
“The decision to change
the name Datsun to Nissan in the U.S. was announced in the fall of
1981. The rationale was that the name change would help the pursuit of
a global strategy. A single name worldwide would increase the
possibility that advertising campaigns, brochures, and promotional
materials could be used across countries and simplify product design
and manufacturing. Further, potential buyers would be exposed to the
name and product when traveling to other countries.”
“Industry observers,
however, speculated that the most important motivation was that a name
change would help Nissan market stocks and bonds in the U.S. They also
presumed substantial ego involvement, since the absence of the Nissan
name in the U.S. surely rankled Nissan executives who had seen Toyota
and Honda become household words.”
Albrecht
Goertz and His Threatened Lawsuit Against Nissan
An event preceding the 1981
name change announcement relates entirely to the Z car and is relevant
to this issue. Japanese automobile industry gains in market share
during troubled times for the Big Three led to a vulnerable public
image. In a way that argued for the corporate symbol to defend itself,
Nissan learned how easily their brand image boat could be rocked. A
former Nissan contract employee and avante garde stylist in his own
right, who taught design ideas and approaches to building cars for
western markets at Nissan from 1963 to 1965 threatened a lawsuit
against Nissan where venue would be Detroit and a General Motors
attorney would prosecute. This story is a colorful part of the Z’s
history, which likely served to reinforce “Nissan” as the name to use
when defending market presence and charging certain future legal
windmills. The employee, of course, was Albrecht Graf (Count) Goertz, a
prolific but solitary industrial designer credibly recognized for
styling the 1955 BMW 503 and 507. His industrial design history
included contributions on 1950 - 1953 Studebakers, and work with
Porsche, Jaguar, and Renault. He knew everyone important from Maxie
Hoffman and Raymond Loewy to Salvadore Dali. His styling concepts
appeared as regular columns in period auto magazines. He has
considerable non-automotive achievements such as Hohner harmonicas,
Olympus cameras, Montblanc fountain pens, and later, Martina
Navratilova’s Puma Design Sportswear. When last we spoke in early 2004,
Goertz told me he was under contract with Steinway doing a new Grand
Piano! His claim, or media promotion on his behalf, for originating the
styling of or the idea for the Datsun 240Z flared into a major
controversy in the late 1970s. Goertz contribution is argued as
strongly in some circles as that of Nissan changing the badging of
their cars from Datsun. We find an accounting in the following sources.
The Third Quarter 1986,
Volume XXIV, Number 3 issue of Automobile Quarterly contains Terry
Greenfield’s article: “The Datsun 240-Z; The Origins of the Species.”
Filled with stunning photography throughout, Greenfield’s article
chronicles the 240Z from its roots in the pre-Z Datsun Fairlady Sports
Cars and represents fine reading for those lucky to own this issue (try
eBay and you’ll find the issue).
As detailed by Greenfield,
Car and Driver Magazine’s journalist Patrick Bedard had obtained
advance release photographs of the Datsun 280ZX before the car’s 1979
first model year introduction. Bedard reportedly invited Goertz, living
in Manhattan at the time, to view these photographs and comment. Car
and Driver published Goertz’ rather negative comments in the November
1978 issue. Being especially provocative, Goertz claimed not to have
been contacted regarding the 280ZX even though he thought himself as
originating the idea for the 240Z.
Some insight into Japanese
and American cultural difference illustrates why the enduring Goertz
claim should be so controversial. As Carl Beck, a pre-eminent student
of the 240Z observed, Japanese culture places the needs of the
Corporation (Datsun/Nissan, he notes in this case) above those of the
team that actually creates the automobile from start to finish. Japan
has a culture that tended to preclude recognition to the team for an
accomplishment even as stunning and well received in its intended
markets as the 240Z. The individuals within the team, then, were even
less likely to be singled out and recognized for their individual
achievements and contributions. (Hence the surprise of Yoshisuki Matsuo
when he was honored at a ZCCA Convention for leading the team that
created the 240Z). In this way Japanese culture markedly contrasted
with American where foundations built on individual creativity and
achievements prompt wide recognition that begins with the individuals
involved. In the case of the Datsun 240Z, Nissan delayed putting
forward any single individual for the automotive media to credit with
“styling,” or “designing” the 240Z. Lack of available facts from Nissan
compelled the media to fill our own culturally unacceptable vacuum for
this information. The result was the media “creation” of a suitable
individual in the guise of Albrecht Goertz, who stands accused in
various circles of having been less than forthcoming about providing
clarification. Too, it had been the English-fluent Goertz who was
present when the 240Z debuted at the 1969 Tokyo Motor Show making
statements about its origin to media. Goertz was an old hand at this
and media listened attentively. He had been present at other Tokyo
shows before, including the 1964 Tokyo Motor Show where Nissan unveiled
the Datsun Silvia. That was indeed a Goertz design, styled for Nissan
with the assistance of Kazuo Kimura who is responsible for the Datsun
Roadster on which the Silvia was based. Only later did Nissan recognize
that the design team for the original 240Z had consisted of Chief
Designer Yoshisuke Matsuo, Interior Designer Sue Chiba, Exterior
Designer Akio Yoshoda, Under Skin Engineering by Hidemi Kamahara and
Tsuneo Benitani, Assistants Eiichi Oiwa and Kiichi Nishikawa. The man
responsible for moving the 240Z through the design process and
promoting it out of the factory was Tiichi Hara.
Ray Hutton writes in his
1982 Collector’s Guide: “The Z-Series DATSUNS,” that in threatening his
suit Goertz was only intent on defending his contribution originating
the concept of the 240Z and explicitly not its design. Hutton is
supportive of Goertz in his Z-Series work. It was Goertz who led the
Japanese to create an automobile, in Hutton’s words, “with the style of
an E-type, the size of a Porsche.” Ultimately, Goertz has been properly
credited for teaching those at Nissan his ideas during the period from
1963-1965. Insight gained from him was within the backgrounds of those
designing, styling, and producing the Datsun 240Z. But for all the
reasons above getting to that admission was quite a ride.
After publication of the
November 1978 issue of Car and Driver, Nissan Motors Company Executive
Vice President Hiroshi Takahashi produced a letter given to Automotive
News. Bits of it were reproduced elsewhere and the following quote is
attributed to Takahashi. “It is absolutely unthinkable that he (Goertz)
had a hand in designing the 240-Z.”
The February 4, 1980 issue
of AutoWeek reported: “Subsequent to the letter, Dr Goertz filed a $3
million libel suit, naming as codefendants Nissan Motor Company, its
President, and NMC-USA.”
However, in his
autobiography, “You’ve Got To Be Lucky,” Goertz does not support that
the actual suit was ever filed. Rather, the threat of an angry Big
Three providing one of their own lead counsels to take the case from
Goertz’ lifelong friend, litigation attorney Peter Kaminer, did the
trick. As Goertz states it in his autobiography, Nissan viewed the
situation as The Auto Industry of the United States versus Nissan,
rather than a tiff over who styled the 240Z. Incidentally, Goertz is an
uneducated man and AutoWeek calling him “Dr.” is blatant media
patronage. It sounds good, but it isn’t so. From my brief conversations
and correspondence with him, and the available literature, I observe
Goertz to be quite authentic, almost certainly touched with creative
genius, and possessing of an infectious personality that is a delight
to experience in small doses. Who Goertz really is lies beyond the
scope of our discussion here. His privately published autobiography is
well worth reading (Krauss Publishing privately published Goertz’
autobiography. The point of contact is Judith Krauss who can be reached
via email at jkrauss@krauss-unternehmensberatung.de).
While these events
surrounding Nissan’s 1979 introduction of the Datsun 280ZX seem quite
esoteric and barely visible to the greater public, Nissan surely
recognized the danger of provoking negative publicity over this lawsuit
in a well-connected Detroit strongly biased against growing Japanese
market share. Nissan made an out of court settlement with Goertz that
included a November 14, 1980 letter signed by Nissan Motor Company,
Ltd., Legal Department General Manager Toshikuni Nyui. In this formal
legal letter Nissan acknowledges that “… the personnel who designed
that automobile [Datsun 240Z] were influenced by your fine work for
Nissan and had the benefit of your designs.” It remains that Goertz’
unexpected threatened lawsuit brought Nissan up short and fast to a
legal environment perhaps better faced with the unifying corporate
symbol rather than the branded marque Datsun.
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Goertz,
“Suitcases,” and the Datsun 240Z.
From his own perspective Mr.
K. is having none of this from Goertz, or anyone else intent on suing
Nissan. Neither Goertz as the source of inspiration for the 240Z or the
way Nissan quietly settled the Goertz matter out of court appeals to
him. As reported in numerous sources, one of Mr. K.’s disappointments
during his time in America (1960 – 1975) was the inevitable fact of
American lawsuits. “Keep the suitcases away from me!” he would instruct
those around him as he ran NMC, USA. Neither was Mr. K. pleased with
corporate Nissan’s unwillingness to challenge back when sued. One
conjectures that the strict Confucian upbringing by his paternal
grandfather presented a strong alternative to the legalistic approach
towards how we all get along with each other in the West.
As he related to me in San
Antonio during the June 2002 Annual Z.C.C.A. Convention, the origins of
the 240Z as a car for the American market were his. “Get the idea, the
image, of the Jaguar with its long nose and short deck in mind but
don’t copy it,” Mr. K. told me were his instructions to Tokyo at the
time. It was Mr. K in America promoting Datsun and its cars, especially
the 240Z.
Consider the following if
you want to connect Goertz and the Datsun 240Z. By the early 1960s,
Albrecht Goertz was viewed as an eccentric but established “master”
industrial stylist with significant accomplishments and at the height
of his career. He provided Nissan with insight and automotive styling
lessons of value during his brief tenure. He predominantly worked in
Hamamatsu at Yamaha for 2 or 3 days at a time 2 or 3 months apart
during the 1963 – 1965 period, while continuing work from his studio in
Manhattan. He strongly promoted the idea of doing a two-seat coupe and
the first Silvia and a prototype A550X sports car, both on the Datsun
Fairlady frame, resulted. I believe that claiming credit beyond the
ideas that became that first A550X, (or Nissan 2000GT prototype), is
flawed media promotion when applied to the final product, the Datsun
240Z. Goertz has been an avante garde and well connected one man show
throughout his life. It is not in the cards that he would act to dispel
a media generated aura surrounding him. Few such persons ever do and
this seems the crux of the matter regarding the Goertz Myth and the
240Z.
Voluntary
Export Restrictions and Nissan’s Decision to Build a Factory in America
A review of political
factors at play in the domestic automobile industry when the badging
was changed from Datsun to Nissan provides further insight why Nissan
may have taken this decision. That history brought the Japanese to the
decision of building factories in America and has been detailed in
academic treatise. Washington University economics professor Arthur T.
Denzau wrote one such piece entitled “The Japanese Automobile Cartel”
published in the Volume 12, Number 1, 1988 issue of The Cato
Institute’s quarterly journal “Regulation.” In his article Denzau
details how in 1979 OPEC tripled the price of a barrel of crude. This
resulted in a gallon of gas rocketing to $1.40. Lee Iacocca
orchestrated a Federal-backed bailout to rescue Chrysler, in de facto
bankruptcy. Americans were flocking to foreign car dealers to buy
smaller fuel-efficient cars and the Big Three began to lobby for import
controls. The Big Three specifically desired some impediment to Japan’s
growing domestic market penetration, if only to allow them time to
catch up in quality small car design. 1980 saw record loses in the Big
Three of $4 billion dollars and the laying off of 210,000 U.S.
autoworkers. Ronald Reagan was elected President and calls were growing
in political circles to address Detroit’s serious concerns. Senators
John Danforth and Lloyd Bentsen announced their intention of promoting
legislation mandating restrictions on Japanese automobile imports.
Reagan Administration Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige announced he
was planning meetings with Japanese government officials to broach the
issue of voluntary limits on their automobile imports. This policy came
to be called “VER” or Voluntary Export Restrictions, widely perceived
to be a more flexible and rapid fix for growing Japanese market share
than actual legislation if the Japanese could be convinced to make the
commitment. Finally, Reagan Administration Transportation Secretary
Drew Lewis announced he would form a taskforce to facilitate VER
restraint from the Japanese.
Here is the chain of events
elaborated by Professor Denzau. On April 21, 1981 the powerful Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) announced they
would voluntarily enact export quota restrictions. On April 30, 1981
both the Japanese and the American governments announced that the
Japanese VER would quickly be placed into effect. MITI announced the
actual quota restrictions on June 10, 1981 for the 6 largest Japanese
automobile companies (and, in Denzau’s view, thereby set up much of
their automobile industry as a cartel with controlled production and
profit, immune to anti-trust action in American courts). The VER
reduced Japanese imports overall by as much as 500,000 cars a year. On
June 24, 1981 a similar VER was enacted between Japan and West Germany.
The short story detailing the results is clear in retrospect. Japanese
investors knew a good thing when they saw it. The Japanese auto
manufacturers saw almost $1 billion added to their stock market
capitalization in a few short months. VER not only inoculated the
Japanese against anti-trust, it pointed them in the direction of more
expensive, luxurious, well-designed and competitive models for their
top end. Acura, Infiniti, and Lexus directly grew out of this. Our Z
car community’s reigning (pre-350Z) marvel of engineering we know as
the Nissan 300ZX Twin Turbo was produced using powerful design
technologies acquired by Nissan in the 1980s. The cost of all cars went
up, including American, and the Big Three returned to great
profitability. On March 28, 1985 the Reagan Administration announced it
would no longer ask for an extension of VER quotas and Chrysler was
able to pay off its federally backed loans early.
So that’s an interesting
story. Its applicability here lays in being a motivation for the
Japanese decision to begin transplant construction. Building in America
was a way of growing market share, answering further calls for
limitations on import production volume, and securing position and
national acceptance by employing a whole lot of Americans. Nissan and
Toyota followed Honda’s earlier construction of a factory in
Marysville, Ohio and broke ground to build their first American
factories during this time period in Smyrna, Tennessee and Georgetown,
Kentucky. Now we need to look at the history surrounding Nissan’s first
American factory, the point to which the lengthy examination above
leads.
Driving Datsuns in Smyrna, Tennessee
Nissan had been searching
out possible locations for an American automobile manufacturing plant,
especially in the southern tier of American states, since well before
their early 1980 announcement of the fact. For these economically
struggling states the prospect of a Japanese automobile factory with
its promise of thousands of good paying secure jobs was a goal to be
aggressively pursued. Such a factory meant the ability to keep families
local and build a middle class in areas that used to see their sons and
daughters depart for employment opportunities unavailable nearby. 24
State Governors bid for the site after Nissan announced their intent to
build in America. Tennessee Republican Governor Lamar Alexander
assembled a 30-person task force to do whatever it would take to get
Nissan to build in Tennessee. Success came with an announcement by
Nissan on October 30, 1980 that Smyrna, Tennessee had won. What
happened at groundbreaking represents some of the most colorful and
provocative history of this era in the automobile industry.
Nissan Project Director at
Smyrna, Masahiko Zaitsu, clearly stated Nissan intent to find and hire
an American who would build an American factory for Nissan staffed
almost entirely with American management and American workers. Nissan,
in marked contrast to Honda or Toyota, clearly stated their anti-union
bias right from the start. The person they found to ramrod the whole
thing firmly embraced their views. Nissan’s man was Marvin Runyon, only
just retired from a career with Ford Motor Company that began in 1943.
Over the next 7 years, until President Reagan appointed Runyon to head
the Tennessee Valley Authority (he then went on to the position of
Postmaster General, becoming known as “Carvin’ Marvin”), Runyon managed
to get designed, built, and up and running one of the most advanced
automotive factories in the world. The events at the February 3, 1981
groundbreaking drove home what kind of fight Nissan would be in to
defend its non-union bias. Here is the story of what happened that day
in February 1981.
The Smyrna plant was designed as the “sister plant” to Nissan’s Zama
plant in Japan. Runyon had selected a non-union firm, the Daniel
Construction Company of Greenville, South Carolina, to build it. On the
day of groundbreaking, a publicly open event, several hundred union
construction workers were present and intent on disruption. The scene
is recorded on pages 38 and 39 of the book “Nissan in Tennessee” which
Runyon had published to commemorate the entire period of construction.
The basic theme was summed up in the phrase “Boycott Datsun.” Men
carried signs reading “Quality Projects with Skilled UNION Craftsmen.
Boycott Datsun.” More “Boycott Datsun” bumper stickers had been
plastered over the driver’s windshield on the Datsun pickup which,
equipped with a snowplow, was to make the ceremonial first
groundbreaking. In case the point was lost on anyone, the truck’s tires
had been slashed and there were shouts of “Japs Go Home” from the union
protestors. An infamous photograph appears on page 38 of “Nissan in
Tennessee.” Mitsuya Goto, who was General Manager of Public Affairs,
International Division, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., had been assigned
to drive the truck and make the ceremonial groundbreaking cut. Wading
through a crowd of union construction workers much larger than he, one
of them thrust a Boycott Datsun placard in his hands. He is shown
smiling widely and holding the placard.
More than ugliness with the
name Datsun attached was afoot at Smyrna that day. It was also in the
air as a plane appeared overhead towing a banner that read: “Boycott
Datsun. Put America Back to Work.” Marvin Runyon, a man of no small ego
or lack of courage, fought his way to the truck, started it, and made
the ceremonial cut. Nissan had been given clear warning that its
decision to build automobiles in America in a non-union labor
environment would be challenged.
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These
photographs were taken on February 3, 1981 at groundbreaking
ceremonies for Nissan’s new factory in Smyrna, Tennessee and appear in
the book “Nissan in Tennessee” commissioned by Marvin Runyon to
commemorate Nissan’s new factory.
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This
period bumper sticker is an exemplar of a Big Three labor force
desperate to hang on to jobs as flawed corporate boardroom decisions
finally caught up with the reality of buyer preference for small cars
that worked.
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| At this time
the “Datsun” badge continued to appear on cars destined for the North
American and Western markets. Brand recognition overall was solid.
Datsun had become a name beloved to Z car enthusiasts and employees
with fond memories of days spent selling and servicing Datsuns on the
roads. Yet the cars were all a product of Nissan as the parent company.
A powerful corporate symbol, then, and perhaps inevitably to be used in
battles to come against unionization efforts.
The
Cost of Changing the Name to “Nissan”
So, what did this cost?
Well, operational costs to include changing signs at 1100 Datsun
dealers ran $30 million. The 1982 to 1984 advertising campaigns, where
the “Datsun, We Are Driven!” campaign yielded to “The Name is Nissan”
campaign was worth $200 million. (“The Name is Nissan” campaign was
used for some years beyond 1984). Aaker estimates another $50 million
was lost in Datsun advertisements that were paid for but unused or
terminated early. A final large yet indefinite cost is assumed by Aaker
to have occurred from “brand confusion” as some North American buyers
simply avoided the “Datsun,” “Datsun by Nissan,” or “Nissan” automobile
altogether during this time period. As a premise, Aaker maintains that
brand name awareness is a critical element in product sales. (Indeed,
promoting brand awareness has always been a big part of the Z car’s
corporate mission). Thus, he speculates that if Nissan lost “only” .3%
(three tenths of one percent) of sales due to this confusion during the
transitional period, the lost revenue would come to several hundred
million dollars. 5 years after the name change program was over,
“Datsun” still remained more familiar than “Nissan.”
The
View of the Datsun Z Enthusiast
Almost certainly there was
more to Aaker’s observation that corporate Nissan leadership simply
wanted “Nissan” to be as much a household name in America as “Toyota,”
or “Honda.” Z car enthusiasts ardently followed these events and can
expand upon Aacker’s suggestion of “substantial ego involvement.” Those
close to the history of Mr. K. as the Japanese automotive executive
credited with building Datsun’s American presence in the first place,
suggest that changing the name from Datsun was a matter of further
“de-Katayama-izing” Nissan in America. Datsun had grown enormously
since Mr. K. began building it upon his 1960 arrival on the West Coast.
It was well beyond a business where one man’s paternalistic approach
could rule the day, even though Mr. K.’s individual guidance worked
wonderfully at the time. Indeed, it must have been a lot of fun during
those early years! Simpler times… Yet all too soon Mr. K.’s
individualistic style, the “fun part” of free enterprise, essential in
building presence from the ground up would be viewed negatively.
Historical accounts repeatedly describe personalities, cliques,
clashes, and comeuppance as giant egos vie for dominance in the
automotive world’s corporate boardrooms. Colorful expose often forms
the heart of this industry’s historical accounts and Japanese
boardrooms prove as fertile a ground as any. Datsun sales nationwide
had grown very large by 1981. Nissan Motor Corporation - USA leadership
evolved the greater complexity demanded of running an enormous,
multi-billion dollar import business. The name change had been held off
as long as possible in North America and the key Western markets. With
WWII now long past, boardroom concerns likely ran more negatively
towards continuing association with the long ago name “Datsun.” Those
who believed Datsun was no longer the right name to proceed into a
future where Nissan was to pursue a commanding presence in the
automotive world won the day.
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Those wishing to share
comments and insight into Datsun and Nissan history are welcome to
contact me via e-mail at dlbanks54@comcast.net
Dan Banks
Z.C.C.A. Historian
Z Car Club of Northern Virginia, Secretary
1990 300ZX Twin Turbo, Z.C.C.A. Gold Medallion #15
1971 240Z HLS30-22151 (2/71)
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